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Training is a key factor in the economic performance of all countries. It is a major tool 
for increasing productivity and living standards (Ok and Tergeist, 2002). Concentrating 
training amongst workers who perform complex tasks and have high levels of formal 
education may create a virtuous circle for these high skill workers resulting in higher 
wages, further training opportunities, longer tenure and greater social status (Gershuny, 
2005). In contrast, workers who are disadvantaged in the education process may be less 
likely to receive training, inducing a vicious circle for these low skill workers; further 
increasing their risk of unemployment and social exclusion (Keep et al, 2002). Simply 
ensuring equity of training opportunity may not, however, be sufficient to assure a 
reduction in wage inequality among workers if individuals with different characteristics 
obtain different benefits from the same training scheme. The British Government is 
increasingly concerned with the potentially contradictory implications of training policy 
for equity and efficiency, namely, redirecting training investment towards groups that 
receive less training or towards groups of workers where expected returns are larger 
(Department of Trade and Industry, 2005). 
 
Economists have tended to concentrate on the efficiency issues. In the seminal Becker 
(1962 and 1964) competitive model, employees support the costs of their general training 
by accepting a wage below their potential current marginal product during the training 
period. They then reap the full return from their investments through higher wages after 
the training period, even if there is job turnover. The training level reached corresponds 
to the socially optimal condition, although underinvestment in general training may occur 
if workers face wage inflexibility or are liquidity constrained.  Employees are predicted 
to invest wisely according to their own expected rates of return. Firms will not finance 
this general type of training with its probable negative poaching externalities. 
 
Recent non-competitive models emphasise how market frictions may transform general 
training into de-facto specific training if the wage level is lower than marginal product in 
the post-training product (Stevens, 1994; Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998, 1999a, and   3
1999b).  In such an environment, firms have an incentive to finance general training and 
to distribute these training opportunities amongst employees, thereby introducing issues 
of allocation. Furthermore, since the wage level is below marginal product and there is 
uncertainty concerning labour turnover, a negative poaching externality may occur, 
leading the firm to under invest and the equilibrium training level to be below the socially 
optimum level.  
  
This paper concentrates on the relationship between training and wages. Our results may 
be seen as a further empirical investigation of the determinants of training (for both the 
firm and employee) and the potential returns from this training which helps to fill a gap in 
a still unresolved area of research  (Pischke, 2001: 543, Leuven, 2002: 34). We seek to 
address three fundamental questions. Do different types of training have similar impacts 
on both wage levels and wage dispersion? Is general training a key tool for reversing 
wage inequality between high skill and low skill workers? And finally, in line with the 
recent imperfect competition models, is there a contribution from employer financed 
training to wage inequality in Britain?  
 
  In the process of seeking answers to these questions, it is important to estimate the 
individual employee’s rates of wage return to training. Relevant empirical studies are not 
easy to locate; Frazis and Loewenstein (2005) recently conclude “we are aware of few 
studies that attempt to estimate rates of return to training”. Often due to data constraints, 
most of the relevant studies that do exist estimate average returns for all training 
recipients, ignoring that the provision and returns to training across employees may differ 
according to gender, age, education level, occupation and sector of employment.  Using 
longitudinal data on households and individuals (the British Household Panel Survey, 
BHPS), we can address many of these issues. 
 
1. Modeling Wage Returns  
The relationship between investment in training and wages has been explored decisively 
by Becker (1962 and 1964), Ben Porath (1967) and, of course, Mincer (1958, 1962, 1970 
and 1974) with the development of the well known Mincer wage regression.    4
 
In subsequent years, authors have increased the number of explanatory variables included 
in the regression: initially with the introduction of tenure, as a proxy for specific training 
investment, and later with the addition of variables capturing individual, job and firm 
characteristics (for a recent review see Chiswick 2003). In this augmented framework, 
training may be considered as inherently heterogeneous and it is legitimate to expect the 
size of the wage returns to differ according to the nature and the type of the training 
program (Leuven, 2004: 19). Several limitations have been identified in this research area 
associated with methodological questions; with database quality; and with the mixed 
continuous-discrete nature of training variables. We will return to discuss some of these 
issues below. 
 
Following in the tradition of the literature on training (see Melero, 2004; Booth and 
Bryan, 2006; and in particular Lowenstein and Spletzer, 1998), we estimate the wage 
return from different types of training using the following Mincer type wage regression:  
 
ijt ij i it t ijt ijt T Y X W ε υ µ α δ β + + + + + = ln                             (1) 
 
Where lnWijt is the natural logarithm of the real (1998 prices)
 hourly wage of individual i 
in job j at time t; Xijt is a vector of individual, job and workplace characteristics; Tij  
represents different measures of training accumulated by the worker and Yt is a vector of 
year-specific dummy variables. Unobserved characteristics are decomposed into an 
individual fixed effect µi, an unobserved job match specific component νij and a transitory 
shock εijt. The individual effect µi is considered as an omitted measure of time invariant 
characteristics such as ability, motivation, and ambition or career commitment. The 
unobserved components (µi and νij ) become a problem for the consistency of estimates if 
they are in some way correlated with the regressors. Following Lowenstein and Spletzer 
(1998), we address this problem by estimating the model with fixed effects and 
approximating νij with a binary variable accounting for employer change.  
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2. The Data  
We use data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) which is a nationally 
representative sample of private British households. The BHPS was launched in 1991. 
Each year, individual adult members of households are interviewed over a broad range of 
socioeconomic topics resulting in a rich and relevant data set. In 1992 and 1993 
respondents were also asked for lifetime employment status and job histories which we 
also include in the analyses below. 
 
The BHPS questionnaire was extended in (and continuously from) wave 8, conducted in 
1998, to include information on the type, and the duration, of the three most recent 
training courses attended since September of the previous year; how these courses were 
financed; and where they took place.  
 
Our sample is an unbalanced panel of employed and self-employed individuals in Britain, 
in the 18 to 65 age bracket (that are original, temporary or permanent BHPS sample 
members). We exclude those individuals working in Agriculture, Fishing Service, Mining 
and Quarrying sectors and those missing relevant training information. Our final sample 
contains 20,538 training observations over four years (1998 to 2001), from 6,924 
individuals, a little over half of whom are men (52%). Information from previous waves 
of the BHPS is also included for these individuals. In total, we use BHPS data collected 
between 1991 and 2001, inclusively. 
 
Concise variable definitions and summary statistics are presented in Table 1. Means and 
standard deviations are presented in columns one and two for the full sample, and in 
columns three and four for those workers trained. Columns 5 to 8 (and columns 9 to 12) 
present analogous information for white collar (and blue collar) employees. We define 
the white-collar group of employees to be the: managerial, professional, associate 
professional and technical occupations. The blue-collar group consists of: clerical and 
secretarial, personal service, sales, craft and related, plant and machine operatives, and 
other semi-skilled and unskilled occupations.  
   6
 
2.1 Training Measures 
The BHPS questionnaire asks individuals to choose one of the following five non-
mutually exclusive options about “… the training schemes or courses [they] have been on 
since September …” of the previous year:
  
 
    1 - Was this training to help you get started in your current job? 
    2 - To increase your skills in your current job? 
    3 - To improve your skills in your current job? 
    4 - To prepare you for a job or jobs you might do in the future? 
    5 - To develop your skills generally? 
 
Based on the answers to this question, we define three different categories of training for 
the construction of our dichotomous and continuous variables related to the incidence and 
intensity (duration) of training respectively. The first is the widest category including any 
of the five options and is defined simply as training. It consists of either specific and/or 
general training components, and is expected to improve the worker’s skills either in their 
current job or in any other job.  
 
We define the second category as general training. In this category, the interviewees 
have chosen the fourth and/or fifth options, and recognize that the training events include 
general components and may improve post training skills outside the actual job or 
workplace.  
 
To construct our third category we include additional information concerning four non-
mutually exclusive options for the financing of training. We define this third category as 
employer-financed general training, or simply financed general training, and construct a 
binary indicator variable that allows us to identify if the general training event (option 4 
and/or 5 above) was also financed by the employer. This variable is set equal to one if 
trained workers recognize that fees were paid by the employer or if they respond that 
there were “no fees”.  As Booth and Bryan (2006; footnote 3) highlight, individuals may   7
reveal a certain economic naivety if they respond that nobody has covered direct or 
indirect training costs. In our sample, for more than 72% of courses attended in the 
employer workplace or in the employer training centre, the workers involved reported no 
fees.   
 
The proportion of employees responding that they had received training in Britain was 
32% during the period from 1998 to 2001 inclusively (column 1, panel 1 of Table 1). On 
average, and in contrast with the results obtained using British workplace data (Almeida-
Santos and Mumford, 2005)
1, women have a higher rate of participation than do men 
(34% and 29% respectively). A similar training incidence (31%) has been found by 
Booth and Bryan (2005) using the BHPS database over a shorter time period (1998-
2000).  
 
Amongst the specific group of trained individuals, 91% of the courses attended include 
components that improved their general skills; however, only 74% of courses increased 
their general skills and were additionally financed by the employers.  On average, trained 
workers participated in 2.1 training courses over the four years.  
 
The average intensity (or duration) of the set of three training events attended per year 
was approximately 26.7 days. Not surprisingly, general training courses and financed 
general training events both tend to be of shorter duration. Women experience not only a 
higher training incidence but also a higher intensity. On average, women have 6 more 
days of training per year relative to their male counterparts.  
 
2.2 Individual and Job Characteristics 
Amongst the group of variables quantifying individual and demographic characteristics, 
are several measures of the individual’s aptitude and opportunities which may be related 
to wages and training outcomes, such as: labour market work experience; highest formal 
                                                 
1 Findings for other countries can be found in Almeida-Santos and Mumford (2004), Bassini and Brunello 
(2003), and Brunello (2001).   8
education level achieved; the possession of a vocational qualification; current job tenure; 
gender; and race.  
  
Rather than using a proxy for potential lifetime work experience (such as the commonly 
used age minus years of schooling), we construct a continuous variable for the years of 
actual labor market work experience using the individual’s employment history since first 
leaving full-time education (via combining information available in wave 2 (1992) and 
the subsequent waves of the BHPS).
2 We find that, in 71% of the cases, workers have 
more than 20 years of work experience and in only 5% of the cases do they have less than 
three years of work experience. In our sample, men typically have more work experience 
than women despite them being, on average, approximately the same age.  
 
Table 1 also reveals that trained workers have more years of formal education and less 
years of tenure in their current job. Employees have on average 5 years of tenure in their 
current job. This value is not out of line with estimates of current job tenure in Britain 
found in other studies (Almeida-Santos and Mumford, 2005; Melero, 2004; Mumford and 
Smith, 2004). The relationship between current job tenure and training is, however, not 
clear theoretically. For example, employees with higher current job tenure may have a 
shorter expected future employment period (before retirement) for the employer to reap 
the return from training investment. On the other hand, long tenure may represent a 
higher quality match between firm and employee, and therefore a greater incentive to 
finance training.  
 
It is important when investigating the relationship between training and wages to consider 
relationships that may otherwise limit the efficiency and/or consistency of training 
estimates. First, training accumulated in the current job should be distinctly measurable 
from training accumulated in previous jobs.  This allows testing of the joint hypothesis of 
no depreciation and that training is transferable across employer. Furthermore, the 
measures of training incidence and intensity should ideally fully capture the amount of 
                                                 
2 We follow Swaffield (2000) and adopt a linear spline instead of the common quadratic form.   9
training accumulated over the working life because it is the stock of human capital 
accumulated via training, and not just by the most recent flow, that affects wages.   
 
We have data on the cumulated events of training acquired in the period 1998 to 2001. 
The stock of human capital accumulated before this period is captured by current job 
tenure and previous work experience at the beginning of the period. Using cumulated 
events allows for greater flexibility and reduces potential bias due to errors in self-
reported training (Ariga and Brunello, 2006; Frazis and Loewenstein, 2005; and Melero, 
2004).  We use single time period lagged training measures as instruments, reducing the 
risk of bias if cumulated training events and wages are simultaneously determined, or if 
the measure of training is correlated with any omitted variable.  We also consider 
alternative econometric specifications in order to test a range of hypotheses; both for the 
incidence and the intensity of training (discussed in more detail below).  
 
A further complication when calculating the return to training is related to promotions. It 
is possible that employees are offered training prior to being promoted and before 
increasing their job responsibilities; this potential correlation between job-related training 
receipt and future promotions also needs to be addressed (Melero, 2004: page 14).  The 
descriptive statistics in Table 1 indicate that individuals with longer working hours, 
current union membership, full time employment status, vocational qualifications, and 
who were promoted last year are more likely to be trained, especially in the case of 
women.  We return to consider the relationship between training and promotion below.  
 
Amongst the occupational groupings, managers and administrators; professional 
occupations; and associated professional and technical occupations are more likely to 
participate in a training program compared to those employed in sales; plant and 
machines operators; and other occupations.  Suggesting that the likelihood to be trained 
may also increase with the task’s complexity and the responsibility required for the job. 
To further explore this possibility, the sample is into white and blue-collar workers.  
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It is assumed that high skill workers are allocated to occupations where tasks are more 
complex and job responsibilities higher. White-collar workers usually enjoy faster wage 
growth, they are better educated, more able to perform intellectually complex work 
related tasks (Bishop, 1997) and consequently are predicted to generate a higher rate of 
return from training. In our sample, blue-collar workers receive fewer training events and 
have shorter training spells than do their white-collar counterparts (see Table 1). 
 
2.3 Workplace and Market Characteristics  
Whilst non-work attributes may have a significant impact on training and productivity, 
the work environment characteristics beyond the control of employees may also inhibit 
ability and motivation to perform activities (Clifton, 1997). Several measures are 
included in the empirical analyses as controls for some of these characteristics such as: 
region of residence; economic sector; firm type; and firm size. The definitions and 
summary statistics for these workplace and market characteristics are included in the 
lower panels (panels 2 and 3) of Table 1.  
 
 
3.  Results  
Table 2 reports the instrumental variable estimates of our three training measures from 
the fixed effect model (FE/IV) for training incidence (upper panel) and intensity (lower 
panel). Though only the relevant wage returns are reported in Table 2, the independent 
variables include the individual-level control variables listed in Table 1 and discussed in 
section 3, such as age, marital status, gender, hours worked, union membership and 
education, plus the more aggregate level controls such as economic sector, workplace 
characteristics, and region. A full list of the controls is provided in the endnotes to Table 
2 (and Table 3) and all results are available from the authors upon request. 
 
All the results presented in Table 2 (and Table 3) are based upon robust standard errors
3. 
The overall test of the explanatory power of the regressors is clearly significant for all the 
                                                 
3 Serial correlation in the idiosyncratic errors of the linear panel-data model was tested for (Wooldridge, 
1995). The null hypothesis is that there is no autocorrelation of first order from the regressions. According   11
regressions and whilst the goodness of fit measures are not high, they are comparable 
with those found in other studies of training (see Leuven, 2002). Overall, the parameter 
estimates are generally well defined and have the expected sign.  
 
Several alternative functional forms were also considered, with training measures 
entering quadratically; as a logarithm; a cubic root; and incorporating interaction terms. 
However, neither robust results
4 nor higher goodness of fit measures were obtained 
compared to the results reported in Table 2. (These additional results are available from 
the authors on request). 
 
As discussed above, cumulated training events and wages may be simultaneously 
determined and/or correlated with omitted variables. The possible endogeneity of 
cumulated training events is considered via a Hausman test. The hypothesis that the 
cumulated training variables are exogenous is rejected
5. The validity of using lagged 
cumulated training measures as instruments is considered with a Sargan test of over-
identifying restrictions for a panel data fixed effects regression via instrumental variables 
estimated previously. The null hypothesis is not rejected
6 and the single time period 
lagged training measures are accepted as valid instruments. 
 
The relationship between training and wages may also vary across types of employees. 
To consider this possibility more fully, fixed effect wage regressions with instrumental 
variables are estimated for the full sample of employees (columns 1, 2 and 3 of Table 2) 
and for two separate worker groups: white-collar (columns 4, 5 and 6) and blue-collar 
                                                                                                                                                   
to the Wald test (1, 2782) and the critical values obtained using STATA9 namely 0.115, 0.120 and 0.118 
respectively, the null hypothesis of no first order autocorrelation is not rejected.  
4 The set of interaction terms considered in the model and found to be statistically insignificant are: 
training*years of school; training*female; training*tenure; training*tenure2; training*part-time; 
training*log hours; training*promoted and training*several occupation measures reveal. The inclusion of a 
quadratic term for training is statistically insignificant (at a level of 15%) and equal to zero.    
5 Estimates were obtained with a fixed effect 2SLS model. The Hausman test statistics [χ
2(45)] obtained are 
227.76 for the widest category of training, 227.58 for general training and finally, 225.45 for financed 
general training. 
6 The null hypothesis is that the instrumental variables are uncorrelated with idiosyncratic residuals in 
equation (1), and therefore they are valid instruments. This test results are 1.635, 2.581 and 0.792 
respectively, which are smaller than the 5% critical value in the Chi-square distribution with one degree of 
freedom (3.84).   12
(columns 7, 8 and 9). Columns 1, 4 and 7 present the ‘base’ results for training incidence 
(upper panel) and training intensity (lower panel). Columns 2, 5 and 8 report the 
estimated wage return to cumulated training events when the promotion measure is 
included in the base model. In columns 3, 6 and 9 cumulated training measures (with both 
the current and the previous employer) are also added to the model.  
 
3.1 Training Incidence 
Beginning with the results for the full sample of employees (Table 2 columns 1, 2 and 3), 
the incidence of a training course (ignoring the components that the course may include) 
is associated with an increase of 0.96% in wages (column 1), whilst the wage return to 
general training is associated with an increase of 1.37% (or 1.32% if the general training 
course is financed by the employer).  
 
Controlling for unobservable time invariant heterogeneity significantly reduces the 
training estimates. (The IV estimates from the pooled OLS model for the different 
cumulated training events are twice as high
7.) As discussed above, the Hausman test 
rejects the hypothesis that the two sets of estimates are not significantly different, 
supporting a greater reliance on the more consistent fixed effect results.  
 
Similar estimates of wage returns from training have been obtained by Lynch (1992a and 
1992b) and Veum (1995) using the American National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
Cohorts (NLSY); and Schǿne (2004) using the Norwegian Survey of Organisations and 
Employees (NSOE)). Arulampalam et al (2006), using the European Community 
Household Panel Series (ECHP), conclude that “Britain, Denmark and Finland – are also 
amongst the countries with the lowest returns, of approximately one percent per event”.  
 
Our estimated wage returns to training are, however, relatively low compared to those 
obtained by Booth and Bryan (2006) and Melero (2004) using the same database (BHPS) 
for the period of 1998 to 2000 and for the period of 1991 to 2002, respectively. There are 
                                                 
7 The IV estimates from the pooled OLS model are 0.0220 for cumulated training events, 0.0215 for 
cumulated general training events and 0.0256 for cumulated financed general training events. All of the IV 
estimates are statistically significant at a level of 1%.     13
some important differences between our approach and these earlier studies that may help 
to explain our lower estimates. In particular, we consider employees aged 18 to 65 (they 
included 16 to 65 year olds); we do not include employees in Mining and Quarrying; our 
sample period is longer; we control for the possible endogeneity of training events using 
instrumental variables (they use current period training); we control for a larger set of 
independent variables; and, perhaps most importantly, we use different definitions of 
training (for example, Booth and Bryan include induction training). 
   
Returning to our results, as predicted by the classical model, specific and general training 
components included in the same training category are found to be associated with a 
lower wage return than are exclusively general training courses (either financed by 
employers or not).  This point may be seen by comparing the estimates for both types of 
training events in columns 1, 4 and 7 of Table 2.  The broadest measure of training is, 
however, not statistical significant (at a level of 15%) for either the full sample or the 
skill subgroups. 
 
The estimates for training are robust to the inclusion of the promotion measure in the set 
of explanatory variables (column 2). Nevertheless, promotion has a significant and a 
positive relationship with wages. Employees can expect their wage to rise by 4% when 
they are promoted.  
 
Dividing training events into those with the current or previous employer (column 3 of 
Table 2), training events (incidence) with the previous employer do not have a 
statistically significant relationship with current wages in the full sample estimates. This 
finding is consistent with the classical model if, for example, skills received from training 
have depreciated and/or training is not transferable. Further dividing training with 
previous employer into (i) general training and (ii) firm financed general training (reading 
down column 3 in panel 1), general training or firm financed general training with 
previous employers also do not have a systematic relationship with wages for the full 
sample of British employees. 
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Concentrating on white collar employees (column 5), the wage returns associated with 
training are similar in size to those found for the full sample with the exception of the 
larger returns from firm financed general training (1.62% compared to 1.32% for the full 
sample). Cumulated training events with specific and general components have an 
insignificant relationship with wages. In contrast, however, cumulated general training 
events and cumulated employer-financed general training events have a positive and 
significant relationship with wages.  
 
For the blue-collar sample, the wage return related to employer-financed training is lower 
than for white-collar workers, although it is also statistically insignificant
8 at a level of 
15%. Similarly, cumulated training events with previous employers may appear to have a 
stronger association with wages than do training periods with the current employer 
(2.97% compared to 1.34% for general training and 3.03% compared to 1.46% for firm 
financed general training in the full sample), however, they are also statistically 
insignificant at a level of 15%. Other studies (Loewenstein and Spletzer, 1998; Booth and 
Bryan, 2005) have found the potential impact of training received in previous 
employment to be several times higher than training with the current employer, although 
they find this relationship to be statistically significant, perhaps because they do not 
control for endogeniety in cumulated training events.  
 
To reiterate, for blue-collar workers, training events do not have a significant association 
with wages for any of the three training measures considered. This is also true for training 
events with the previous employer or with the current employer. The potential impact of 
training on productivity and wages apparently differs according to the occupation (white 
or blue collar) of the group of workers that participates in the training program. In the 
case of white-collar employees, general training (either financed or not) is positively 
associated with wage increases. This is clearly not the case for blue collars employees 
                                                 
8  This finding may be inconsistent with the predictions of recent non-competitive models but still 
consistent with classical human capital theory in the presence of long-term labour contracts (Lazear and 
Oyer, 2003). 
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3.2 Training Intensity 
The estimates of the fixed effects model with instrumental variables (FE/IV) for training 
intensity (duration) are reported in the lower panel of Table 2. The results for the full 
sample (columns 1 to 3) are consistent with those found for training intensity. All three of 
the training measures are associated with wage increases (column 1). Promotion is also 
positively related to wage increases (of 4%) but controlling for promotion does not 
change the estimates of the wage return from training. Furthermore, it is training with the 
current employer that is associated with wage growth. There is no significant evidence 
that training intensity with previous employers is related to wage rates for the full sample 
of British employees. 
 
Dividing the workers into white and blue collar, the results again reveal that training is 
only significantly related to wage changes for white-collar employees (columns 4 to 6). 
For these employees, the cumulated days of training (training intensity) has a significant 
and positive relationship with wages (0.08% in column 4), even after controlling for 
promotion (0.08% in column 5). An employee undergoing a training program (which 
includes general components) lasting for 20 days, with their current employee, may 
expect a wage increase of 1.6%, ceteris paribus. Training with previous employers is 
again found to have an insignificant association with wage, in contrast to cumulated 
training days with the current employer. 
 
The intensity of general training events financed by the employer appears, however, to be 
insignificant for white-collar employees in contrast to the results found for training 
incidence (comparing the final 4 rows in panel 1 with the final 4 rows in panel 2).  
 
For blue-collar workers (columns 7 to 9), consistent with the results for training 
incidence, training intensity does not have a statistically significant relationship with   16
wages, either for training courses attended with the current employer or with the previous 
employer.  
 
To reiterate, our results indicate that wage returns differ according to the nature and the 
type of the training program and by the type of employee (white or blue-collar).  Equal 
access to training programs will not reverse wage inequality in favor of low skilled 
employees if blue-collar employees do not derive a wage benefit from participating in 
training. Whilst, the nature of the components included in the training programme are 
related to differing wage returns for white-collar employees, there are nevertheless clear 
gains for them associated with training.  
 
4. Training and Wage Dispersion between Groups  
It appears that training may have a non negligible role in wage inequality amongst 
workers in Britain. We next evaluate the contribution of different types of training to 
wage dispersion during the time period of 1998 to 2001, giving special attention to the 
contribution of (a) general training and (b) general training that is financed by the 
employer.   
 
4.1 Wage Gap Decomposition 
Following Oaxaca and Ransom (1994), the mean wage gap can be written as:  
4 4 4 4 43 4 4 4 4 42 1
4 43 4 42 1 43 42 1
4 43 4 42 1
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Where Ww
 represents the wages of the white-collar group (advantaged group) and Wb
 
represents the wages of the blue-collar group (disadvantaged group); ln(Qwb+1) is the 
endowment component; ln(Dwb+1) = ln(δw*+1)+ln(δb*+1) is the remuneration or the 
discrimination component; δw* and δb* are respectively the blue collar wage disadvantage 
and white collar wage advantage associated with discrimination; and  β* is a set of 
benchmark coefficients equal to: 
  b w I
^ ^
* ) ( β β β Ω − + Ω =                                       (3)   17
representing a matrix of relative weights of the estimated vector of coefficients and the 
identity matrix (I).  Other choices have been suggested for the weighting matrix Ω 
(Oaxaca and Ransom (1994)); for example, Cotton (1988) sets Ω=αwI where αw is the 
proportion of white collar employees; Reimers (1983) adopts Ω=1/2I ; and Neumark 
(1988) suggests Ω= (X’X)
-1(X´wXw) where X’X= X’wXw+X’bXb and is equivalent to 
using the coefficients from the pooled sample of workers.  
 
Table 3 reports the white-collar/blue-collar wage decompositions based on the results 
presented in Table 2 and the variable means presented in Table 1
9. The estimated 
coefficients for those regressors that are time invariant were recovered, in a second stage, 
using an OLS estimation of the residuals of the FE/IV estimation over those time 
invariant regressors.  
 
The gross wage differential
10  across the time period is 70.2%. When the group of blue-
collar workers is taken as the standard competitive (Ω=0) the portion of the measured 
wage gap due to coefficients differentials is smaller and the portion due to endowments 
differentials larger compared to using the white collar wage structure (Ω= 1). Even in this 
case, however, most of the wage differential is explained by measured productivity 
differentials across white and blue-collar workers.   
 
It is clear from these results that training is associated positively with wage dispersion. 
The extent of this contribution varies according to the method of decomposition adopted: 
the method that adopts the blue-collar wage structure (Ω=0) predicts a smaller 
contribution from training relative to the white wage structure adoption. The type of 
training is itself of little relevance for wage dispersion:  our widest category of training 
and general training contributes little more than 1 to 2.5% of the overall wage 
differentials. Cumulated general training events either financed by the employers or not 
reveal a much higher contribution.  
                                                 
9 Our results may be affected by an identification problem if the remuneration effect attributed to training is 
not invariant to the choice of the left-out group. Yun (2005) presents a simple solution for this problem by 
utilizing a “normalized” wage equation for binary variables. This solution is unfortunately not applicable in 
our case  because the training variables measure cumulated events for the period 1998-2001.  
10 The wage gap:  G =[Exp(0.532)-1]*100   18
 
 
Table 3. Wage Gap Decompositions  
  Source: British Household Panel Survey, 1998 - 2001 
 
 
The results do not suggest that training is a major tool for reversing wage inequality 
among workers. On the contrary, it seems that training is a contributor to the wage 
dispersion across high and low-skill workers, even if  the training programme includes 
general components that may increase the employee’s wage offers across firms
11.  The 
                                                 
11 A limitation with the original Oaxaca and Blinder (1973) approach is that the wage gap is measured at 
the mean, thereby ignoring potential differences in the form of the entire wage distribution (Dolton and 
Makepeace, 1987; Munroe, 1988). Several techniques have been developed to overcome this limitation. For 
example, the use of quantile regressions (Juhn, Murphy and Pierce, 1993) allow for the decomposition of 
the wage gap at different points of the wage distribution. We explored the relationship between wages and 
training (for all three of our training measures) using quantile regression techniques and did not find 
significant differences across the wage distribution. In our particular example, where we are interested in a 
comparison of high and low skill workers (rather than higher and lower waged workers) we believe that the 
Oaxaca and Blinder decomposition continues to be a valid and a pertinent approach. 
 




  Wage Gap                                                             (ln Gwb+1) 0.532 0.532  0.532 
 
w ˆ β  - estimated coefficient for training  (white-collar group)  0.009 0.013  0.016 
 
b ˆ β  - estimated coefficient for training  (blue-collar group)   0.002 0.004  0.001 
Ω=1  Due to endowment                                                      (ln Qwb+1) -0.064 -0.040  -0.037 
  Due to discrimination                                                 (ln Dwb+1) 0.587 0.578  0.578 






         Endowment effect of Training  0.007 0.011  0.009 
        Discrimination effect of Training  0.006 0.010  0.010 
Ω=0.5 Due to endowment                                                      (ln Qwb+1) -0.019 0.004  0.005 
  Due to discrimination                                                 (ln Dwb+1) 0.542 0.533  0.536 






         Endowment effect of Training  0.004 0.007  0.005 
        Discrimination effect of Training  0.009 0.014  0.014 
Ω=0  Due to endowment                                                      (ln Qwb+1) 0.026 0.048  0.046 
  Due to discrimination                                                 (ln Dwb+1) 0.497 0.489  0.495 






         Endowment effect of Training  0.002 0.003  0.001 
        Discrimination effect of Training  0.012 0.018  0.018   19
implications of these findings may be further explored by concentrating analyses on the 
returns to training for workers within skill and age bands.  
 
 
5. Wage Returns to Training within Groups  
The white and blue-collar groups considered in Table 2 are further subdivided into three 
different age groups: lower than thirty; between thirty and forty five, and older than forty-
five (i.e. 30<; 30-45; and >45).  Table 4 presents the IV/FE estimated wage returns from 
cumulated training events for these white-collar and blue-collar age groups. The models 
presented in Table 4 are directly comparable to those in Table 2 and are subjected to the 
same battery of diagnostic testing. Independent variables controlling for individual, job, 
workplace, and market characteristics are also included (see endnotes to Table 4).  
 
A striking result is found when analysis is concentrated on the different age bands of 
white and blue-collar employees. Cumulated training events (incidence), independent of 
the nature of components that they may include, are not statistically significantly related 
to wages for either white or blue-collar workers who are younger than thirty.  
 
Considering white-collar employees in more detail, general training (and especially 
financed general training) with the previous employer has a positive and statistically 
significant relationship with wages for white-collar workers older than 45 (at a level of 
10%).   Within the 30 to 45 year age band, however, cumulated training events with the 
current employer are found to be significantly related to wage increases for these 
employees. Implying that there is a peak age period (the 30 to 45 year band) during which 
white collar employees should seek training opportunities. 
 
A possible explanation for these results may be that workers younger than 30 have lower 
expected tenure; they may have a lower quality employer job match and consequently 
have a higher probability of leaving. Analogously, older workers may also represent a 
high risk of short tenure to employers, limiting the opportunity of those who finance 
training to reap all the returns from such investment.   20
 
For blue-collar employees, only training events with previous employers are associated 
with wage growth and this is true only for those employees aged between 30 and 45 (at a 
level of 15%). It would appear that the returns for younger (below 30) blue collar 
employees from training are limited in the short run and that training expenditure during 
these years constitutes a relatively long term investment.  The size of these relationships 
for these workers is, however, notable: cumulated training days with previous employers 
are associated with 11.21% wage growth; 12.84% if this training is general in nature; and 
16.52% if the training was financed by the previous employer.  
 
Turning to consider training intensity (duration) in the lower panel of Table 4, the results 
are similar for the white-collar employees. High skill (white-collar) workers, aged 30 to 
45, typically obtain significant wage returns to cumulated training events with the current 
employer; whilst employees from the same skill group who are older than 45 typically 
gain from cumulated general training events with previous employers
12. Surprisingly, 
however, for white-collar employees who are less than 30 years old, cumulated training 
intensity with previous employer is now found to have a negative and a significant impact 
(at a level of 10%) on wage.  It may be job turnover after training is treated as a negative 
signal of potential employment stability by future employees of young white-collar 
workers resulting in a wage penalty.  
 
Point estimates for training duration are in most cases insignificant (at a level of 15%) for 
the group of blue-collar workers. The only exceptions are the point estimates obtained for 
general training for the 30 to 45 year age bracket (column 7 of Table 4).  
 
Our results suggest the relationship between training (incidence and intensity), implied 
productivity level and wage is not uniform for high and low skill employees nor is it 
constant over the working life of an employee. Consequently, the impact of training 
                                                 
12 The estimated wage return from cumulated training events with a prior employer is 0.04% and it is also 
highly significant (at levels of 1%).   21
policy may be distinct and/or have very different impacts with respect to the age and the 
occupation of the recipients.  
 
 
 6. Conclusion 
We use British panel data from 1991 to 2002 to explore the wage returns to training (both 
incidence and intensity) undertaken by employees between 1998 and 2002. We find that 
(after controlling for individual, job, workplace, and market characteristics) the wage 
returns differ greatly depending on the nature of the training (general or specific); who 
funds the training (employee or employer); the skill levels of the recipient (white or blue 
collar); and the age of the employee.  
 
In general, the estimated wage returns to training courses for British employees are 
typically small at less than 1%. Although, training courses that include general 
components are associated with a higher wage as are training courses undertaken with 
previous employers.  
 
The relationship between training and wages, however, is found to differ according to the 
occupation (white or blue-collar) and the age of the group of workers that participates in 
the training programme. We find very limited wage returns from training (incidence or 
intensity) for blue collar employees aged between thirty and forty five years, and no 
significant returns for younger or older low-skill workers. This result contrasts with the 
range of positive returns found for high skill employees. White collar employees also 
have higher training incidence and intensity than blue collar workers, suggesting a 
virtuous circle between training and wage growth for white-collar employees (but not for 
blue-collar employees).  
 
Using decomposition analysis, we further conclude that unequal remuneration to different 
skill groups from contributes positively to wage inequality across white and blue-collar 
employees in Britain. These results imply that merely promoting equal access to training   22
programmes will not be sufficient to reverse wage inequality in favor of low-skilled 
workers.  Indeed, it may exacerbate wage inequality. 
 
 
   23
References 
 
Acemoglu, D. and Pischke, J.S. (1998). ‘Why do firms train? Theory and evidence’, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics,  vol. 113(1), pp. 79-119. 
Acemoglu, D. and Pischke, J.S. (1999a).  ‘The structure of wages and investment in 
general training’,  Journal of Political Economy, vol. 107(3), pp. 539-572.  
Acemoglu, D and Pischke, J.S. (1999b). ‘Beyond Becker: Training in imperfect labor 
markets, The Economic Journal vol. 109, pp. F112-F142. 
Almeida-Santos, F. and Mumford, K. (2004). ‘Employee training in Australia: Evidence 
from AWIRS’, Economic Record vol. 80, pp. S53-S64.  
Almeida-Santos, F. and Mumford, K. (2005). ‘Employee training and wage 
compression in Britain’, The Manchester School vol. 73 (3), pp. 321-342.  
Ariga, K. and G. Brunello. (2006). Are the more educated receiving more training? 
Evidence from Thailand. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, vol. 59 (4), pp.  
Arulampalam, W. Booth, A. and Bryan, M. (2006). ‘Are there Asymmetries in the 
effects of training on the conditional male wage distribution?’ Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review, vol. 59 (4), pp.  
Bassanini, A. and Brunello, G. (2003). ‘Is training more frequent when wage 
compression is higher? Evidence from the European Community Household 
Panel’, IZA, Discussion Paper 839.  
Becker, G.S. (1962). ‘Investment in human capital: A theoretical analysis’, Journal of 
Political Economy vol. 70, pp. 9-49. 
Becker, G.S. (1964). Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with 
Special Reference to Education (The University of Chicago Press, 3
rd Edition, 
Chicago). 
Ben-Porath, Y. (1967). ‘The production of human capital and the life cycle of earnings’, 
Journal of Political Economy, no. 75, pp. 352-365. 
Bishop, J.H. (1997). ‘What we know about employer-provided training? A review of 
the literature’, Research in Labor Economics vol.16, pp. 19-87. 
Booth, A.L. and Bryan, M. L. (2005). ‘Testing some predictions of human capital: New 
training evidence from Britain’, Review of Economics and Statistics vol. 87(2), 
pp. 391-394.  
Booth, A.L. and Bryan, M. L. (2006). ‘Who pays for general training? New evidence 
for British Men and Women’, Research in Labor Economics, vol. , pp.    24
Brunello, G. (2001). ‘Is training more frequent when wage compression is higher? 
Evidence from 11 European countries’, PuRE publications, The Research 
Institute of the Finnish Economy, Helsinki, Finland. 
Chiswick, B. (2003). ‘Jacob Mincer, experience and the distribution of earnings’, 
Review of Economics and the Household  vol.1(4), pp. 343-362. 
Clifton, J. (1997). ‘Constraining influences on the decision to participate in training: the 
importance of the non-work environment’, Cornell - Center for Advanced 
Human Resource Studies, Working paper no. 97-25. 
Cotton, J. (1988). ‘On the decomposition of wage differentials’, Review of Economics 
and Statistics vol. 70, pp. 236-243. 
Dolton, P.J., and Makepeace, G.H. (1987). ‘Marital status, child rearing and earnings: 
Differentials in the graduate labour market’, Economic Journal, vol. 97, pp.   
897-922. 
Department of Trade and Industry. ( 2005). ‘Fairness at work. Chapter two. Business at 
Work’, retrieved from http://www.dti.gov.uk/er/fairness/part2.htm on 
21/12/2005. 
Frazis, H. and Loewenstein, M. A. (2005). ‘Reexamining the returns to training: 
Functional form, magnitude and interpretation’, Journal of Human Resources, 
vol. 40(2), pp. 435-452. 
Gershuny, J. (2005). ‘Busyness as the badge of honor for the new super ordinate 
working class’, Social Research vol. 72(2), pp.287-314 . 
Heckman, J. (1979). ‘Sample selection bias as a specification error’, Econometrica, vol. 
47,  pp. 153-163. 
Juhn, C. Murphy, K.M. and Pierce, B. (1993). ‘Wage inequality and the rise in returns to 
skill,’ Journal of Political Economy, vol. 101,  pp.  410-442. 
Keep, E. Mayhew, K. and Corney, M. (2002). ‘Review of the evidence on the rate of 
return to employers of investment in training and employer training measures’, 
SKOPE Research Paper Nº 34, (Summer), University of Warwick. 
Lazear, E. and Oyer, P. (2003). ‘Internal and external labor markets: a personnel 
economics approach’, NBER Working Paper Series  no.10192. 
Leuven, E. (2002). ‘The economics of training: A survey of the literature’, mimeo, 
retrieved from http://www.fee.uva.nl/scholar/mdw/leuven/reviewart.pdf. 
Leuven, E. (2004). ‘A review of the wage returns to private sector training’, EC-OECD 
Seminar on Human Capital and Labour Market Performance, Brussels.   25
Lynch, L. M. (1992a). ‘Differential effects of post-school training on early career 
mobility’, NBER Working Paper Series no. 4034. 
Lynch, L. M. (1992b). ‘Private sector training and the earning of young workers’, 
American Economic Review, vol. 82(1), pp. 299-312; 
Loewenstein, M.A. and Spletzer, J.R. (1998). ‘Dividing the costs and returns to general 
training’, Journal of Labor Economics vol. 16 (1), pp. 142-171. 
Melero, E. (2004). ‘Evidence on training and career paths: human capital, information 
and incentives’, IZA Discussion Paper, no. 1377. 
Mincer, J. (1958). ‘Investment in human capital and personal income distribution’, 
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 66(4), pp. 281-302; 
Mincer, J. (1962). ‘On-the-job training: Costs, returns and some implications’, Journal 
of Political Economy, vol. 70(5) Part2, pp. S50-S79;  
 Mincer, J. (1970). ‘The distribution of labor incomes: A Survey with special reference 
to human capital approach’, The Journal of Economic Literature, vol. VII, 
(March), pp. 1-26. 
Mincer, J. (1974). Schooling, Experience and Earnings, New York, Columbia 
University Press. 
Mumford, K. and Smith, P.N. (2004). ‘Job tenure in Britain: Employee characteristics 
versus workplace effects’, Economica, vol. 71, pp. 275-298. 
Munroe, A. (1988). ‘The measurement of racial and other forms of discrimination.’ 
University of Stirlin.Discussion Paper in Economics, no. 148.  
Neumark, D. (1988). ‘Employer’s discriminatory behavior and the estimation of wage 
discrimination’, Journal of Human Resources, vol. 23(3), pp. 279-295. 
Neuman, S. and Oaxaca, R. L. (1998). ‘Estimating labor market discrimination with 
selectivity-corrected wage equations: Methodological considerations and an 
illustration from Israel’, CEPR Discussion Papers no. 1915,  
Oaxaca, R. L. (1973). ‘Male-female wage differentials in urban labor markets’, 
International Economic Review, vol. 14(3), pp. 693-709. 
Oaxaca, R. L. and Ransom, M. R. (1994). ‘On discrimination and the decomposition of 
wage differentials’, Journal of Econometrics, vol. 61, pp. 5-24. 
Ok, W. and Tergeist, P. (2002). ‘Supporting economic growth through continuous 
education and training – Some preliminary results’, Papers presented at the 
meeting of National Economic Research Organisations, OECD headquarters, 
Paris.   26
Pischke, J.S. (2001). ‘Continuous training in Germany’, Journal of Population 
Economics vol. 14, pp. 523-548. 
Reimers, C. (1983). ‘Labor market discrimination against Hispanic and black men’, 
Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 65, pp. 570-579. 
Schǿne, P. (2004). ‘Why is the return to training so high?, Labour, vol. 18(3), pp.363-
378. 
Stevens, M. (1994). ‘A theoretical model of on-the-job-training with imperfect 
competition’, Oxford Economic Papers vol. 46, pp. 537-563. 
Swaffield, J. (2000).  ‘Gender, motivation, experience and wages’, London School of 
Economics, CEP Discussion Paper, no. 457. 
Veum, J. R. (1995). ‘Sources of training and their impact on wages’, Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review, vol. 48(4), pp. 812-826.    
Wooldridge, J.M. (1995). ‘Selection corrections for panel data models under conditional 
mean independence assumptions’, Journal of Econometrics, vol. 68, pp. 115-
132. 
Yun, M.S. (2005). ‘A simple solution to the identification problem in detailed wage 
decompositions’, Economic Inquiry, vol. 43 (4), pp. 766-772. 
   27 
 
 
Table 1  Variable Definitions and Means  
 
  ALL  WHITE-COLLAR  BLUE-COLLAR 
     With  Training   With Training     With  Training 
  Mean  Std Dev Mean  Std Dev Mean Std  Dev Mean Std  Dev  Mean  Std Dev Mean  Std Dev 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
(1) Individual employee characteristics                        
                      
Less than 3 years of  experience  0.05 0.23  0.06 0.24  0.04 0.20  0.05  0.21  0.06 0.24    0.07 0.26 
3 and less than 8 years of experience  0.07 0.26  0.09 0.28  0.06 0.24  0.07  0.26  0.08 0.27    0.10 0.30 
8 and less than 15 years of experience  0.09 0.29  0.10 0.30  0.09 0.29  0.10  0.30  0.09 0.29    0.10 0.30 
15 and less than 20 years of experience  0.07 0.26  0.08 0.27  0.08 0.27  0.09  0.28  0.07 0.25    0.07 0.26 
More than 20 years of experience  0.71 0.45  0.67 0.47  0.72 0.45  0.69  0.46  0.70 0.46    0.66 0.47 
Age  38.54 11.56  37.17 11.01  39.56 10.80  38.61  10.44  37.90 11.96    35.84 11.34 
Married  0.57 0.49  0.55 0.50  0.59 0.49  0.57  0.50  0.56 0.50    0.53 0.50 
Female  0.48 0.50  0.52 0.50  0.46 0.50  0.52  0.50  0.50 0.50    0.53 0.50 
White  0.96 0.18  0.96 0.19  0.96 0.19  0.96  0.19  0.97 0.18    0.97 0.18 
having a children under 18  0.40 0.49  0.39 0.49  0.37 0.48  0.35  0.48  0.42 0.49    0.42 0.49 
Years of school  10.68 3.15  11.49 2.84  12.27 2.90  12.62  2.67  9.69 2.89    10.44 2.59 
Years of tenure  4.94 6.18  3.99 5.29  4.62 5.80  3.89  5.08  5.14 6.41    4.07 5.48 
Log Hours  3.49 0.40  3.53 0.35  3.57 0.31  3.57  0.29  3.44 0.44    3.49 0.39 
Temporary job  0.06 0.24  0.05 0.22  0.06 0.24  0.05  0.22  0.06 0.24    0.05 0.23 
Part time  0.19 0.39  0.16 0.36  0.13 0.33  0.12  0.32  0.23 0.42    0.19 0.40 
Have a Vocational Qualification  0.39 0.49  0.40 0.49  0.39 0.49  0.39  0.49  0.38 0.49    0.42 0.49 
                      
Trained in previous 12 months  0.31 0.46  1.00 0.00  0.39 0.49  1.00  0.00  0.26 0.44    1.00 0.00 
Number of training course – cumulated events 98-01  0.66 1.51  2.11 2.05  0.93 1.86  2.36  2.32  0.50 1.21    1.88 1.73 
Participated in a general training course in the last year  0.28 0.45  0.91 0.29  0.36 0.48  0.91  0.29  0.24 0.43    0.91 0.29 
Participated  in a general training courses financed by 
employer in the last year  0.23 0.42  0.74 0.44  0.30 0.46  0.76  0.43  0.19 0.39 
 
0.72 0.45 
Number of general training course -cumulated events 98-01 1.51 3.06  3.73 4.22  2.17 3.83  4.39  4.89  1.10 2.37    3.12 3.37 
Number of general training course financed by the employer 
– cumulated events 98-01  1.09 1.77  2.64 2.10  1.49 2.08  2.96  2.29  0.84 1.49 
 
2.34 1.86 
Days of training in previous 12 months  0.89 1.61  2.17 2.06  1.24 1.91  2.46  2.23  0.68 1.36    1.90 1.84 
Days of training in a course with general components in the 
last year  6.67 30.17  21.28  50.92  7.88 31.84 20.01 48.29  5.92 29.06 
 
22.46 53.24 
Days of training in a course with general components 
financed by the employer in the last year  6.09 29.14  19.42  49.50  7.10 30.27 18.02 46.15  5.46 28.40 
 
20.72 52.40   28 
Table 1  (Cont.) 
  ALL  WHITE-COLLAR  BLUE-COLLAR 
    With  Training    With  Training     With  Training 
  Mean Std Dev Mean  Std Dev Mean  Std Dev Mean  Std Dev Mean  Std Dev Mean  Std Dev 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
Union member  0.26 0.44  0.33  0.47  0.28 0.45  0.36  0.48  0.25 0.43  0.30  0.46 
Changed employer in the last year- either for a better 
job or was dismissed  0.04 0.20  0.04  0.20  0.04 0.19  0.04  0.19  0.04 0.20  0.05  0.22 
Promoted in the last year  0.03 0.18  0.05  0.23  0.05 0.22  0.07  0.26  0.02 0.14  0.04  0.19 
                     
Occupations                     
Managers and Administrators  0.16 0.36  0.17  0.37  0.41 0.49  0.35  0.48  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
Professional Occupations  0.11 0.31    0.15 0.36    0.28 0.45    0.32 0.47    0.00 0.00    0.00 0.00 
Assoc. Prof and Technic Occup  0.12 0.32  0.16  0.37  0.31 0.46  0.33  0.47  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
Cleric and Secret. Occup  0.17 0.38  0.17  0.38  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.28 0.45  0.34  0.47 
Craft and Related Occup  0.12 0.32  0.09  0.28  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.19 0.39  0.17  0.37 
Personal and Protect. Serv. Occup  0.10 0.30  0.11  0.32  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.17 0.37  0.22  0.41 
Sales Occup  0.07 0.26  0.05  0.21  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.11 0.32  0.09  0.29 
Plants and Machines Operat.  0.09 0.28  0.06  0.23  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.14 0.35  0.11  0.31 
Other Occup.  0.07 0.25  0.04  0.20  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.11 0.31  0.08  0.27 
                      
(2) Workplace characteristics                      
                      
Economic Sectors                      
Manufacturing  0.12 0.33  0.12  0.33  0.10 0.31  0.10  0.29  0.13 0.34  0.14  0.35 
Electricity, gas and water  0.03 0.16  0.02  0.14  0.01 0.11  0.01  0.11  0.04 0.19  0.03  0.16 
Construction  0.06 0.23  0.03  0.18  0.03 0.18  0.02  0.15  0.07 0.25  0.05  0.21 
Wholesale and retail trade  0.06 0.23  0.04  0.19  0.03 0.16  0.02  0.15  0.08 0.26  0.05  0.22 
Hotels and restaurants  0.00 0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.01  0.00  0.00 
Transport, storage and communication  0.09 0.29  0.06  0.25  0.06 0.25  0.05  0.22  0.11 0.32  0.08  0.27 
Financial intermediation  0.09 0.29  0.07  0.26  0.06 0.25  0.05  0.21  0.11 0.31  0.10  0.30 
Real state, renting and business activities  0.03 0.17  0.02  0.12  0.01 0.10  0.01  0.07  0.04 0.20  0.02  0.15 
Public Administration and Defense  0.04 0.20  0.04  0.20  0.03 0.17  0.03  0.18  0.05 0.22  0.05  0.23 
Education    0.15 0.35  0.16  0.37  0.21 0.41  0.20  0.40  0.11 0.31  0.12  0.32 
Health and Social Work  0.01 0.08  0.01  0.08  0.01 0.09  0.01  0.09  0.00 0.07  0.01  0.07 
Other Community, Social and Personal service .  0.17 0.37  0.22  0.41  0.22 0.41  0.25  0.43  0.13 0.34  0.18  0.39 
Private Households with employed persons  0.15 0.36  0.20 0.40  0.20 0.40  0.25  0.43  0.12 0.32  0.16 0.36 
Extra-territorial organizations and bodies  0.01 0.10  0.01 0.09  0.01 0.07  0.00  0.06  0.01 0.11  0.01 0.11   29 
 
 
Table 1  (Cont.)       
  ALL  WHITE-COLLAR  BLUE-COLLAR 
    With  Training    With  Training     With  Training 
  Mean Std Dev Mean  Std Dev Mean  Std Dev Mean  Std Dev Mean  Std Dev Mean  Std Dev 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Regions                      
London    0.10 0.30  0.10 0.30  0.12 0.33  0.11  0.32  0.08 0.27  0.09 0.28 
                      
Type of Organizations                      
Public organization    0.25 0.43  0.33 0.47  0.33 0.47  0.39  0.49  0.21 0.40  0.28 0.45 
Private organization    0.72 0.45  0.62 0.48  0.62 0.49  0.55  0.50  0.77 0.42  0.69 0.46 
Non-profitable organization    0.03 0.18  0.05 0.21  0.06 0.23  0.07  0.25  0.02 0.14  0.03 0.16 
                      
Size                      
fewer than 25 employees    0.34 0.47  0.30 0.46  0.31 0.46  0.28  0.45  0.35 0.48  0.31 0.46 
25-49 employees at the establish    0.14 0.35  0.14 0.35  0.14 0.34  0.14  0.35  0.15 0.35  0.15 0.35 
50-99 employees at the establish.    0.12 0.32  0.12 0.33  0.11 0.32  0.12  0.33  0.12 0.32  0.12 0.33 
100-199 employees at the establish.    0.10 0.31  0.10 0.29  0.11 0.31  0.09  0.29  0.10 0.30  0.10 0.30 
200-499 employees at the establish.    0.13 0.33  0.13 0.34  0.12 0.32  0.13  0.33  0.13 0.34  0.14 0.34 
500-999 employees at the establish.    0.07 0.25  0.07 0.26  0.07 0.26  0.08  0.27  0.06 0.25  0.07 0.26 
1000+ employees at the establish.    0.11 0.31  0.13 0.34  0.14 0.34  0.15  0.36  0.09 0.28  0.12 0.32 
                      
Real Wage and Wage Compression measures                      
log real (1998 prices) wage    3.47 0.57  3.57 0.55  3.82 0.51  3.83  0.49  3.26 0.50  3.34 0.50 
                      
Number of employees 6.924   3,593    3,136   1,769    4,939   2,168  
Number of observations 20,538  6,436    7,869   3,099    12,669   3,337     30
Table 2  Wage effects of training incidence using different specifications (FE/IV) 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Log of real hourly wage 
All White-Collar  Blue-Collar 
Training Incidence  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Training t- (cumulated events)  0.0096*** 0.0099***  __ 0.0089 0.0091  __ 0.0017 0.0019  __ 
Promoted  __  0.0390**** 0.0392***  __  0.0362** 0.0368**  __  0.0372*  0.0374* 
Training t-1 in the current employer 
(cumulated events) 
__  __  0.0088**  __  __  0.0089 __  __  0.0020 
Training in the previous employer (cumulated events)  __  __  0.0256 __  __  0.0348 __  __  0.0186 
             
General Training t-1 (cumulated events)  0.0137**** 0.0140****  __  0.0129** 0.0133**  __ 0.0037 0.0038  __ 
Promoted  __  0.0397**** 0.0393****  __  0.0370** 0.0375**  __  0.0374* 0.0375* 
General Training t-1 in the current employer 
(cumulated events) 
__  __  0.0134****  __  __  0.0135**  __  __  0.0040 
General Training in the previous employer (cumulated 
events) 
__  __  0.0297 __  __  0.0346 __  __  0.0297 
             
Financed General Training t-1 (cumulated events)  0.0132*** 0.0136***  __  0.0159*** 0.0162***  __ 0.0010  0.0011  __ 
Promoted  __  0.0388**** 0.0390****  __  0.0370** 0.0373**  __  0.0371* 0.0373* 
Finance General Training t-1 in the current employer 
(cumulated events) 
__  __  0.0146****  __  __  0.0165***  __  __  0.0041 
Finance General Training in the previous employer 
(cumulated events) 
__  __  0.0303 __  __  0.0330 __  __  0.0393 
                  
Training Intensity  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
Training (cumulated events)  0.0009**** 0.0009****  __  0.0008** 0.0008*  __ 0.0004 0.0004  __ 
Promoted  __  0.0387**** 0.0392****  __  0.0363** 0.0373**  __  0.0358* 0.0353* 
Training in the current employer 
(cumulated events) 
__  __  0.0010****  __  __  0.0010**  __  __  0.0006 
Training in the previous employer (cumulated events)  __  __  0.0002 __  __  0.0003 __  __  0.0002 
             
General Training (cumulated events)  0.0010**** 0  .0011**** __  0.0008* 0.0008*  __ 0.0006 0.0006  __ 
Promoted  __  0.0386**** 0.0392****  __  0.0368** 0.0378**  __  0.0348* 0.0341* 
General Training in the current employer 
(cumulated events) 
__  __  0.0011****  __  __  0.0009*  __  __  0.0008 
General Training in the previous employer (cumulated 
events) 
__  __  0.0003 __  __  0.0003 __  __  0.0004 
             
Financed General Training (cumulated events)  0.0007* 0.0007*  __ 0.0005 0.0004  __ 0.0004 0.0004  __ 
Promoted  __  0.0382**** 0.0384****  __  0.0354** 0.0357**  __  0.0362* 0.0358* 
Finance General Training in the current employer 
(cumulated events) 
__  __  0.0009***  __  __  0.0007 __  __  0.0006 
Finance General Training in the previous employer 
(cumulated events) 
__  __  0.0003 __  __  0.0004 __  __  0.0011 
                  
 
Source: British Household Panel Survey, 1998 - 2001.   
Notes: Each entry in columns (1) to (9) contains marginal effects.  *Statistically significant * at 85%, ** at 90%, *** at 95%, and **** at 99%. All results 
presented are based upon robust standard errors. Controls are also introduced for: experience, age, marital status, gender, race, having children, years of school, 
tenure, hours worked, having temporary job, having a part time job, having vocational qualifications, being a union member, have left the employer, year, 
occupation, economic sector, region, type and size of workplaces. 
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Source: British Household Panel Survey, 1998 - 2001.   
Notes: Each entry in columns (1) to (8) contains marginal effects.  
*Statistically significant * at 85%, ** at 90%, *** at 95%, and **** at 99%. All results presented are based upon robust standard errors.   
Controls are also introduced for: experience, age, marital status, gender, race, having children, years of school, tenure, hours worked, having temporary 
job, having a part time job, having vocational qualifications, being a union member, have left the employer, year, occupation, economic sector, region, 




FE/IV  White-collar Blue-collar
  All <30  [30-45]  >45  All <30  [30-45]  >45 
Dependent Variable: 
Log of real hourly wage 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
             
Training INCIDENCE             
Training (cumulated events)  0.0091 0.0112 0.0138* 0.0073  0.0019  -  0.0186  -0.0004  0.0079 
Training  in the current employer (cumulated 
events) 
0.0089 0.0067 0.0134*  0.0118  0.0020    0.0031  -0.0022  0.0052 
Training  in the previous employer (cumulated 
events) 
0.0348 0.0482 0.0265 0.0731*  0.0186   -0.0848   0.1121* 0.0420 
             
General Training   (cumulated events)  0.0133** 0.0060  0.0201***  0.0077  0.0038 -0.0135 -0.0021 0.0139 
General Training in the current employer 
(cumulated events) 
0.0135** 0.0041  0.0206*** 0.0136  0.0040    0.0074  -0.0044  0.0112 
General Training  in the previous employer 
(cumulated events) 
0.0346 0.0471 0.0262 0.0731* 0.0297 -0.0602   0.1284* 0.0405 
             
Financed General Training  
(cumulated events) 
0.0162*** 0.0255  0.0211*** 0.0109  0.0011  -0.0182  -0.0006  0.0131 
Financed General Training  in the current 
employer (cumulated events) 
0.0165*** 0.0233  0.0211***  0.0177   0.0041   0.0098   0.0015  0.0080 
Financed General Training  in the previous 
employer (cumulated events) 
0.0330 0.0761 0.0223 0.0910**   0.0393  -0.0897   0.1652* 0.0337 
FE/IV  All <30  [30-45]  >45  All  <30  [30-45]  >45 
Dependent Variable: 
Log of real hourly wage 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
              
Training INTENSITY              
Training    0.0008* -0.0003   0.0008*  0.0024  0.0004   -0.0007   0.0012    0.0003 
Training  in the current employer (cumulated days)  0.0010**   0.0001   0.0008*  0.0028  0.0006   -0.0009   0.0014  -0.0005 
Training in the previous employer (cumulated days)  0.0003 -0.0005** -0.0017  0.0004**** 0.0002    0.0002   0.0010    0.0012 
              
General Training    0.0008* -0.0004   0.0008*  0.0020  0.0006    -0.0007    0.0013   0.0005 
General Training in the current employer 
(cumulated days) 
0.0009*    0.0000   0.0008*  0.0023  0.0008    -0.0011    0.0015* -0.0004 
General Training  in the previous employer 
(cumulated days) 
0.0003   -0.0005** -0.0020  0.0004**** 0.0004     0.0003   0.0305***  0.0012 
              
Financed General Training    0.0004  -0.0005    0.0019***  -0.0004  0.0004   -0.0006   0.0011   0.0010 
Financed General Training in the current 
employer (cumulated days) 
0.0007  -0.0002    0.0020***  -0.0003  0.0006    0.0000   0.0013   -0.0041 
Financed General Training  in the previous 
employer (cumulated days) 
0.0004 -0.0005**   -0.0002  0.0004**** 0.0011    0.0026   0.0243   0.0011 
              
observations 7869 1646 3768  2455  12669  3760  5232  3677   32
 